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President Nixon: Toughing It Out with the Law
by William Van Alstyne
An exponent of toughing it out with the law, President
Nixon makes such vast and startling claims to
executive authority that the issue is changed from
one of political judgment to the counterfeit issue of
constitutional authority, This conduct has obscured
the true issues in Supreme Court nominations, war
powers, executive impoundment of funds, and
executive privilege in the tapes controversy.
N THE CASE of the Watergate tapes, President
Nixon engaged in toughing it out with the law. In
his own terms, this is a highly principled thing to do-
standing on his authority as president, protecting the
powers of the office from erosion, resisting pressures
from Congress and the press, standing tall in the courts.
This was his reiterated position as he attempted to make
plain why nondisclosure of the tapes was required by
the imperatives of candor and frankness in White House
conversations.
The issue, as he put it, was not the lesser one of the
possible value of the tapes to the Senate select com-
mittee or the special prosecutor, but the more enduring
one of proper authority. To yield the tapes would be
to violate the confidence of all persons having conver-
sation with the president, even on the most sensitive is-
sues, and to impair irreparably the operation of his of-
fice. The people must somehow be made to understand
the problem in these impersonal and constitutional
terms. They must be made to understand this even if
it means discharging prosecutors and attorneys general.
As I listen to the president, however, I cannot avoid
an uneasy feeling of drja vu. Something about the situa-
tion does not quite hang together, and the unmentioned
facts, once remembered, begin to take shape with similar
uses he has made of toughing it out with the law.
In 1971 I combed through a decade of federal case
reporters attempting to gain some perspective on the
judicial decisions of G. Harrold Carswell, who was then
under consideration before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee for appointment to the Supreme Court. I had
a degree of personal interest in Judge Carswell's nomi-
nation, having previously thought a great deal about the
earlier nomination of Clement F. Hayusworth, Jr.,
whose confirmation I had supported in testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. (In fact, I continue to
believe that Judge Haynsworth would have served with
distinction on the Supreme Court.)
In 1972 1 was in the law library again, for a longer
time, in an effort to trace the constitutional history of
the war power.
Only a few months ago I looked up materials that
might help me understand the basis for President Nix-
on's claim that somehow enabled him to impound funds
Congress had appropriated to be spent. Somewhere in
between, I had also been there to see whether, as the
president claimed, he enjoyed an executive privilege to
engage in domestic wiretapping without authorization
by Congress or constitutional review by the courts.
Nixon Changed Issues, Deflected Attention
In each of these situations certain circumstances were
repeated. For instance, in each President Nixon asserted
a claim of, constitutional authority that was itself so vast
and startling as virtually to cause a shift in attention by
an escalation of the issue. It was no longer a question
of the propriety or merits of his position as a political
matter but a larger and very different question of author-
ity: not whether power was being used wisely and sen-
sitively, but whether it existed on the colossal scale the
president claimed.
Coincidence or not, escalation of the issue was adroit-
ly employed to subdue criticism of the president's per-
sonal judgment, deflecting public attention away from
the merits of what he was doing to the different matter
of his technical authority to do it. Moreover, on those
occasions when the courts rejected the transmogrified
issue of authority, finding it without constitutional basis,
even that conclusion was used to political advantage.
The president would transfer the onus of "misunder-
standing" to the judiciary, taking the high ground that
he merely had tried faithfully to vindicate the respon-
sibilities of his office, but that the judiciary had tied
his hands.
In the case of the Watergate tapes, this political tech-
nique again repeated itself. Executive privilege, what-
ever its scope, is at most what the words suggest-a
privilege or option the president has and not a duty.
There is no requirement that it be asserted. When presi-
dents have thought it important to remove doubt and to
assist other departments of government in their under-
takings, materials subject to the privilege have been re-
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leased willingly. The privilege is hardly ravaged by the
exercise of discretion in taking recourse to it; rather, it
stands more to be thrown into disrepute by its selective
use, as in the Watergate affair, when it has the appear-
ance of a cover-up.
Who Can Exercise "Executive Privilege"?
Second, the privilege is that of the president-not of
anyone who happens to converse with him. It is em-
phatically dissimilar to other privileges the president
used for comparison in his televised address of August
14, such as the privilege of a client not to have his at-
torney divulge certain matters without the client's per-
mission (but note, even this does not run to statements
of intention to violate the law), or of a patient not to
have his physician disclose certain matters without his
permission and relevant to his diagnosis. In respect to
executive privilege, however, it is perfectly well under-
stood that no one has a legal claim of curtaining any-
thing he may have told the president from disclosure
when the president thinks it in the public interest to
report it.
Third, the president's use of the privilege in this in-
stance was markedly at odds with his public commitment
made before existence of the tapes was known that, in
view of the fact that sufficient evidence respecting the
appearance of White House involvement in criminal
activities had accumulated, it would be his policy to
reopen the investigation and co-operate with the select
committee and the special prosecutor to restore public
confidence. It is remarkable to think in what way the
withholding of the tapes could have fitted that earlier
description of the national interest.
Fourth, there is the fact that the president already had
breached the confidences of parties to the conversations,
not only releasing each person to testify as to what he
said but also as to what others present during the same
meeting said. even going so far as to lend certain
among the tapes to H. R. Haldeman for Mr. Halde-
man's appearance before the select committee. In es-
sence, the president said that the national interest is best
served by a self-serving breach of some person's con-
fidence and the personal loan of the corroborative tapes
to a person he knew would testify that the disputed sub-
stance of certain conversations confirmed his own ver-
sion.
Nixon Could Have Confined His Objections
Finally, insofar as there may be portions of the tapes
bearing on extraneous matters truly not pertinent to the
business of the select committee or the special prose-
cutor, the president could have confined his objection
to these. In case of a direct challenge that under the
circumstances it would not be appropriate for the presi-
dent alone to say which portions of which tapes were
truly irrelevant (any more, say, than it would be ap-
propriate for the select committee or the prosecutor to
make that determination unilaterally), a federal court
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could provide an in camera review, exactly as has been
done in similar disputes respecting the relevance of in-
formation sought on discovery when its examination by
an outside party has been thought to be not necessary
and possibly prejudicial. This was essentially the posi-
tion taken by the decision of Chief Judge John J. Sirica
of the United States district court in his decision of Au-
gust 29 (360 F.Supp. 1), which was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit on October 12. But President Nixon
chose not to pursue his position in the Supreme Court.
The transmogrification of the issue to one of constitu-
tional power is, in consequence, utterly counterfeit. Now
that the claim of absolute privilege has been made, we
cannot help but be interested in its judicial outcome. To
suppose that the outcome of the legal issue in any way
affects the original question of the way in which the
president tends to conduct himself, however, is unques-
tionably to be gulled once again.
Taken even at face value, moreover, the many con-
stitutional claims have themselves been remarkable, and
here again there is a striking similarity with the way in
which the president is toughing it out with the law by
escalating the character of his claim to the point where
it is the claim itself, rather than his conduct, that grad-
ually captures the news and deflects attention. Perhaps
nowhere was this bettor illustrated than in the Carswell
nomination.
As the Senate was coming down to the wire on that
nomination, the president sought to deflect criticism of
his judgment by insisting that the "real" issue was simply
one of executive prerogative versus congressional usur-
pation. Wasn't it clear, he emphasized, that the Con-
stitution committed the power of Supreme Court ap-
pointments to the president? It was as though he want-
ed only to vindicate the responsibility of the office it-
self, acting as a dedicated surrogate of all presidents,
past and future, determined to preserve their powers
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against inroads by a jealous and partisan Senate. Judge
Carswell was not the issue; rather, the issue was the
Constitution. Redefined in that way, couldn't the pub-
lic readily understand that, whatever the questioned
merit of the nomination, it really wasn't the Senate's
just concern?
But it was the Senate's concern, however the presi-
dent sought to persuade us otherwise. In fact, it turned
out that the president had misquoted the Constitution,
substituting a power to "appoint" for the lesser power to
"nominate" and eliding the part of the clause in the
Constitution that refers to the Senate's "consent."
The other aspect of toughing it out with the law-the
shifting of responsibility for the consequences after de-
flecting attention away from the original issue--also is
apparent. The federal judiciary has been especially
handy for this purpose, even more so than Congress.
In 1970 Congress had made no provision for wire-
tapping or bugging suspected domestic dissidents with-
out judicial authorization or accountability, but the
president again was alert to his own responsibilities.
"Separation of powers" and his prerogatives as chief
executive precluded the courts from applying Fourth
Amendment restrictions, he said. The president alone,
unaccountable to anyone save at election time or by
impeachment, assuming it could somehow be learned
what the president was doing, would determine the oc-
casions, groups, and persons to be surreptitiously moni-
tored in the national interest.
"At Least He Had Done His Own Duty"
In 1972 the Supreme Court rejected this view (407
U.S. 297). denying that the Fourth Amendment ex-
empteid the executive from its provisions whenever he
might claim that domestic security warranted invasions
of privacy without judicial authorization, but still the
president seeks vindication from the result. He has im-
plied that the Court's decision is startling (although the
lower courts had already held the same way, and, so far
as I could determine, professional opinion regarded
the president's own view as the only startling one),
weakening to the public security, and possibly even sub-
ject to the nfdive constitutionalism that characterized the
anti-law-and-order excesses of the Warren Court. At
least, he reassured us, he had tried to do his own duty
to his office by his unflinching efforts of domestic
surveillance.
I followed each of these issues with earnest academic
interest, a little incredulous each time at the. president's
stated view of his own power, occasionally uneasy in
the uncertainty that one or another court might be per-
suaded to his view (or that he might succeed in re-
staffing the Supreme Court with more compliant jus-
tices), but more nearly reassured when the "crisis" was
past, and executive supremacy had not yet been read
into the Constitution. But the recovery period was al-
ways shortlived.
The president plied the same approach again when
he presumed to impound funds appropriated by Con-
gress for disbursement. Did the president really possess
a double veto over acts of Congress? I was aware of the
provision in Article I allowing a power of veto, but
that, of course, is explicitly subject to being overridden
by two-thirds majorities of both houses. Could there
possibly be another, as the president claimed, nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution but somehow implied in
the office of the presidency-a double-speak preroga-
tive to take care that the laws be "faithfully ignored"
rather than "faithfully executed," as the language in
Article II declares?
Judiciary Will Bear the Blame
Thus far, the courts have held overwhelmingly against
this view, although the matter has not yet been decided
by the Supreme Court. Evidently speaking for the presi-
dent, Caspar Weinberger, secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, discounted the, nu-
merous decisions against the president, making clear
that nothing less than a decision by the Supreme Court
would alter the president's course on this issue. Only if
that Court will take responsibility will he desist, with
the canny consolation of having depersonalized the issue
and thrust the blame onto the judiciary.
Consider also the remarkable uses of "constitutional
responsibility" the president's actions have reflected in
Cambodia. A short time ago he stood tall against Con-
gress in reassuring the country that should Congress
forbid the use of funds for further military action in
Cambodia, he was prepared to meet the responsibilities
of his own office by diverting other appropriations al-
ready made. His presidential duty required no less of
him, whatever might be lacking in Congress.
Only was it later to be learned that previous repre-
sentations that the neutrality of Cambodia was being
scrupulously respected were utterly false; that the presi-
dent had authorized large scale bombing concealed be-
neath duplicitous reports for the benefit of several con-
gressional committees that presumably might not have
been trusted with the truth. Was this, too, merely a
question of "privilege" or "authority"? Back in January
of 1971, moreover, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf
resolutida, under which President Johnson supported
his original actions in that area, but President Nixon
was quick to point out that he never regarded that reso-
lution of any importance to his authority.
Watergate: An Issue Elevated to a Crisis
The cases involving the Watergate tapes are doubt-
less interesting, and it is not at all wrong that they
should be seen as posing important questions of con-
stitutional law. But, as in so many other instances, it
may also be useful to note that the crisis is upon us
not so much because of an issue that could not be
avoided otherwise, but that it is an issue inflated to
the level of crisis only in light of the breathtaking char-
acter of the president's highly diverting view of his
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authority. The president, it was argued in his brief
in court, is not subject to the judicial process at all. The
doctrine of. "separation of powers" precludes courts or
Congress from subjecting him to subpoena. He is the
sole judge, moreover, of what the public interest may
require in respect to papers or records within his cus-
tody. Neither courts nor Congress may presume to
second guess a claim of executive privilege or to su-
pererogate an authority to require an explanation of its
basis or sufficiency. It is simply a matter entirely within
executive discretion alone. Like domestic surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment? Like appointing justices
to the Supreme Court? Like the power of war? Like
the power to impound funds and the duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully ignored? Yes, evidently much
like these.
Disdain for a Tacky Quotation
Last summer we watched with growing interest (and
not a little apprehension) as John Ehrlichman toughed
it out before the Senate select committee, laying claim
to presidential powers of burglary as the president alone
might think appropriate in the interest of national se-
curity. Is the Fourth Amendment subject to suspension
by an act of executive privilege? The mere suggestion
is disturbing, but there was Mr. Ehrlichman's very able
counsel lecturing Senator Ervin that it might be so.
At least, he pointed out, the Supreme Court had not
had occasion to hold otherwise when the president
claimed an interest in "national security." What had
happened, Senator Talmadge asked, to the understand-
ing that not even the king of England could enter the
most humble and dilapidated dwelling of his realm
without the owner's consent? Considerably "eroded,"
Mr. Ehrliehman suggested, with just a trace of disdain
at the senator's tacky quotation.
None of this is to say that the Watergate tapes cases
had an easy, foregone conclusion-that the courts were
bound to hold against the president or, indeed, that they
should so hold. Other issues involved in the cases might
trouble a conscientious court, and there is an important
area where claims of executive privilege should be
treated with deference: not necessarily by utterly abdi-
cating and forswearing any power of judicial review,
as the president's brief argued, but simply in the care-
ful and painstaking exercise of that review. A modest
court, not desiring to appear unsympathetic to the
needs of the presidency, even while being reluctant
to affirm such far-reaching absolutes as President Nixon
asserted, might struggle to find a less alarming basis
at once more moderate and fair.
Tapes Aren't Crucial to Select Committee
It could do so were it to determine. that the tapes
at best are of only marginal value to the select com-
mittee since the committee's objective is to determine
the need for additional corrupt practices legislation. Re-
solving particular conflicts of testimony regarding cer-
tain White House conversations may not be important
to its task, and accordingly it might not be unreason-
able to sustain the claim of executive privilege under the
circumstances.
President Has Not Acted Consistently
The same analysis did not apply to the interest of
the special prosecutor, since he was charged with the
different task of determining whether existing criminal
statutes (such as those concerning perjury and obstruc-
tion of justice) have been violated. Resolving conflicts
of testimony by the possible corrooorative (or exoner-
ating) value of the tapes would be highly relevant to
his responsibilities. But as to him, exactly as Charles
Alan Wright, the president's counsel, suggested, there
was also an alternative to forcing disclosure of the tapes
contrary to the will of the president. If the court had
concluded that indictments ought not be returned against
persons when the president withholds material possibly
vital to their prosecution or defense, it may simply de-
clare that there can be no indictments or trials.
This need not have been the result, of course, and
the case on the other side is itself very impressive-most
especially as the president had not acted consistently with
his own claim of a need to maintain the confidentiality
of the conversations or even the confidentiality of the
tapes he loaned to Mr. Haldeman. In confronting the
courts with a direct challenge that the president is whol-
ly immune to any inquiry at all, however, his lawyers
may have encouraged the courts to find a way to avoid
that issue, rather than to appear to, act from animus
toward the president and to accept the blame.
"Toughing It Out" Is a Last Resort
Whatever the, outcome in particular cases, there is
nonetheless a more depressing pattern that has emerged
from this strategy of toughing it out with the law. The
more generous view, that the president is simply an
extraordinary activist who cares deeply about the sepa-
ration of powers and means only to protect the integrity
of his office from corrosive jealousies of a petty Con-
gress and a permissive judiciary, is scarcely maintainable
anymore. Rather, toughing it out with the law has been
reduced to the most enfeebled function, a habitual last
line of defense whenever nothing else is left to say.
In this sense, the Watergate tapes may even be a para-
digm case in which the questionable propriety of a deci-
sion is sought to be submerged in the very different issue
of technical constitutionality. The president displayed no
seemly concern for confidentiality in freely lending his
tapes to the friendly witness, Mr. Haldeman, for in-
stance. It is difficult to become indignant with Her-
block's cartoon impression of how the president evi-
dently saw it: "It's a privilege," he says brightly, as he
hands over the tapes to Mr. Haldeman.
Possibly it was a privilege in the same sense that the
Constitution may not forbid the president so to conduct
himself, although it remains to be seen whether even this
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is true, but it scarcely seems to matter a great dcal-
the list of "privileges" has simply, gotten out of hand.
Milk dealers are allowed a sudden price rise following
organized- contributions for the president's personal ben-
efit. The LT.T. case is suddenly settled after a $400,000
gift. American Airlines ransoms itself front political sky-
jacking. Two plumbers "misunderstand" instructions
and burglarize a psychiatrist's office. The acting director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also "misunder-
stands" and burns a file containing a falsified record
implicating a former president in the assassination of a
foreign head of state. Contributions given for campaign
purposes are diverted to the defense of individuals under
indictment for criminal invasion of opposition offices.
Congress is lied to about the respected sanctity of a
neutral country, and reports are falsified to make it
believable. Letters are fabricated to misrepresent public
reaction to presidential policy in mining foreign har-
bors, and polls are manipulated to demonstrate wide-
spread support. A federal judge is invited to consider a
presidential appointment while presiding over a criminal
trial in which the administration has a direct political
interest. Following a thorough investigation that was
never held, a firm statement clearing all White House
personnel of any involvement is issued. Co-operation is
pledged, assurances are provided that no one is to be
protected, but what may be useful evidence is cur-
tained in secrecy save for the most safe and symbiotic
witness, even while the president's counsel is advising
a court that confidentiality of the evidence from all
others is so important to the president as to warrant the
possible abandonment of indictment or prosecution as
an alternative to any further disclosure whatever.
Merely interesting questions of law? An issue of priv-
ilege, perhaps, or one of separation of powers? Or,
rather. a dcspcrate strategy to avoid the inevitable con-
sequences of incredible hubris and overwhelming scan-
dal?
From one office window at the law school where
President Nixon was an excellent student more than
thirty years ago, admittedly, the view I have of all this
is far from perfect. Increasingly these days, however, it
is pretty much deja vu.
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Annual Meetings
1974-Honolulu, Hawaii, August 12-16.
1975-Montreal, Canada, August 11-15.
1976-Atlanta, Georgia, August 7-12.
1977-Chicago, Illinois, August 6-11.
1978-New York, New York, August 5.10.
Midyear Meetings
1974-Houston, Texas, January30-February 5.
1975-Chicago, Illinois, February 19-25.
1976-Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February
12-18.
Notice by the Board of Elections
The following jurisdictions will elect a
state delegate for a three-year term begin-
ning at the adjournment of the 1974 an-
nual meeting and ending at the adjourn-
meat of the 1977 annual meeting:
Alabama Montana
Alaska New Mexico
California North Carolina
Florida North Dakota
Hawaii Pennsylvania
Kansas Tennessee
Kentucky Vermont
M assachusetts Virginia
Missouri Wisconsin
Nominating petitions for all state dele-
gates to be elected in 1974 must be filed
with the Board of Elections at American
Bar Association headquarters not later
than January 30, 1974. All nominating
petitions will be published in the March,
1974, issue of the American Bar Associa-
tln Journal.
While it is desirable that more than
the required minimum of twenty-five
names of members of the Association ap-
pear on a nominating petition, only twen-
ty-five names of signers of any petition
will be published, as provided by Section
6.3 (b) of the Association's Constitution.
Only signatures of members of the As-
sociation will be counted. Each nominat-
ing petition must be accompitnied by a
typewritten list of the names and address-
esof the signers in the order in which
they appear on the petition. The petition
must be accompanied also by a seventy-
five word biographical sketch of the
nominee. Forms for this purpose will be
provided. The biographical sketch will be
included in the ballot material seat to
each Association member in the state for
which the nominee is a candidate for the
office of state delegate.
A candidate for nominee aisd all sign-
ers must be members of the Association
whose membership is accredited to the
state where the election is being held.
There is no limit to the number of candi-
dates who may be nominated in any state,
and the nominations are made only on
the initiative of members themselves.
Each nominee for the office of state
delegate is entitled to receive one list of
the names and addresses of the Associa-
tion members in his state. The list is to
be made available only after the proper
filing of a nominating petition, upon
written request.
Forms of nominating petitions may be
obtained from the Board of Elections at
the headquarters office of the American
Bar Association. 1155 East Sixtieth
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637. Nominat-
ing petitions must be received at the
headqu.9rters of the Association before
the close of business at 4:45 j'.M.. Jan-
nary 30. 1974. Ballots will be mailed to
the members in good standing. acciedited
to the states in which elections are to be
held, not later than March 15, 1974, so
that thcy will be received by members at
approximately the same time as the
March issue of the Journal containing
the nominating petitions of the various
candidates.
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